Security in international research and innovation collaboration (URIS guidelines)

PET identifies risk countries. As at 1 July, the high-threat countries to research are: Iran, Russia and China.

In the vast majority of cases, there is no risk in collaborating with researchers from countries identified by PET as high-threat countries. There are only a few areas where we need to pay special attention. These include in particular dual use areas - research with both military and civilian applications.

We’re not. At Aarhus University, we’re responsible for implementing the URIS guidelines to protect researchers and research from abuse and unwanted attention. That’s our responsibility. We can’t outsource background checks to PET because assessing a potential employee's field of research and their application requires the university's expertise, but PET has provided input on how background checks can be performed.

Our focus is on the potentially risky use of research and the people who are at risk of coming under pressure.

Freedom of research means that researchers are free to choose what they want to research within their field, what methodology they use, and where they publish. Sharing raw data with is regulated under other parts of the University Act than the definition of freedom of research.

The background checks will involve several people, but primarily the hiring manager in collaboration with the new HR unit. Briefly, the HR unit will conduct an open source search, and the hiring manager will answer a questionnaire, which includes questions about the type of research the potential employee will be involved in. Based on this, in consultation with the dean, the head of department will then assess the overall security risk and either approve or reject the applicant.

HR at the NAT/TECH administrative centre will set up a new unit trained by PET and others, to conduct screenings.

The background checks will use open sources that are accessible via the internet. Training includes distinguishing between credible and non-credible sources.

We don't know exactly how effective the tool is. During the pilot period at Tech and Nat, some applicants have been turned down. The reason was that we weren’t 100 per cent certain that we could protect the person from being pressured into disclosing confidential information.

Yes, if they want to hire an employee, enrol a PhD student or bring in a guest from a high-threat country, they will need to help ascertain the background of the prospective employee or guest.

No, we have no reason to believe that our employees from Iran, Russia or China are potential spies. This initiative is also about safeguarding our employees from being put under pressure by those regimes. If they receive unwanted attention or an unpleasant enquiry from their home country's intelligence services, employees should always be able to go to their manager. In theory, any researcher with access to sensitive data can be put under pressure, including Danish researchers. We screen researchers from URIS countries because PET believes they are at a higher risk of being contacted.

No. We shouldn't be wary of any researcher who asks relevant questions. We do checks at the front door.

Having a healthy and positive work culture is a shared responsibility. We shouldn't start being concerned about colleagues with citizenship from certain countries.

Yes, an off-boarding procedure is on the way, and it will be included in the second roll-out of URIS procedures, expected in late 2024.

In general, no. If they are hired then they should be treated as any other employee. It will be up to the individual laboratory to determine what information the student should have access to.

Visitors to AU don’t have access to sensitive information, and thanks to GDPR guidelines, we’ve become much more aware of protecting information. Upper secondary school students are still very welcome.

Yes of course, which is why we need to be very careful about not over-implementing the guidelines.  I can't guarantee that we won't say no once too often, but we won't automatically say no because a person is a citizen of a high-threat country. 

No. There will be a procedure for devices when travelling, which means that when you travel to a high-threat country, you’ll be given a computer and mobile phone that will be reset by the IT department when you return.

Not necessarily. But an archaeological researcher may have knowledge about the location of underground cables, for example, which may be sensitive information that should not be shared with hostile states.

No. But we can’t know exactly who has knowledge that could be of interest to hostile states. I usually compare it to the rules for handling radioactive material: I expect all researchers at AU to know that there are rules for working with radiation. I don't expect many people to know the rules in detail because the rules are only relevant to those who work with radiation. It’s the same with the URIS guidelines; everyone should know that it's a regulated field. But no many need to know the rules in depth.